Aristotle mentions the four classes of existence in the introductory chapter of his book, Categories. These classes of existence are expressed by him as not in subject but predicated to subject, in subject but not peredicated to subject, both in subject predicated to subject and neither in subject nor predicated to subject. These are described by Farabi and Ibn Rushd respectively as the universal essence, singular accident, universal accident and singular essence. In the logic of propositions, these classes of existence have an importance in the context of subject-predicate relation. From this point of view, only the universal entities, i.e. the universal essence and the universal accidents can be a predicament. Farabi evaluates the situation of universals predicate in terms of giving information about the substance and accidents of the subject. Accordingly, the universal essence is given only information about the substance of subject, while the universal accident provides information on both the substance of subject and the of accident of subject. Ibn Rushd finds this approach of Farabi wrong and therefore contrary to Aristotle's purpose, in terms of the unity and multiplicity of the subject that the universals predicate. This study tries to analyze universal essence and accidents from the classes of assets that can be a predicate by means of the three mentioned philosophers. Here, first of all, Aristotle's classes of existence and Ibn Rushd's comments on it, and then Farabi's approach to those who can become predicates are examined. Finally, based on the Ibn Rushd's criticisms on Farabi, the difference between the two philosophers is evaluated.