'Memory' As A Reference Of Personal Identity In John Locke


Aktürk E.

AGP Humanities and Social Sciences Conference,, Barcelona, İspanya, 4 - 07 Şubat 2016, ss.164-167

  • Yayın Türü: Bildiri / Tam Metin Bildiri
  • Basıldığı Şehir: Barcelona
  • Basıldığı Ülke: İspanya
  • Sayfa Sayıları: ss.164-167
  • Van Yüzüncü Yıl Üniversitesi Adresli: Evet

Özet

This study deals with various philosophical responses or approaches to the question of “What is the ultimate reference of personal identity?” In this context, the following approaches are articulated and thoroughly examined respectively: (i) the physicalist or naturalist approaches which draw personal identity on material or bodily components, (ii) the psychological approaches which take memory to be the reference of personal identity and, (iii) the dualist or immaterialist approaches which explains personal identity in terms of soul or mind. In so doing, it is argued that the reference of personal identity can neither be reduced to a physical or bodily part nor be explained via psychological continuity in terms of memory or character. Rather, it is suggested that personal iden- tity can only be secured by reference to a simple, indivisible immaterial substance such as soul or self.